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Abstract   Illicit drugs are trafficked across manifold borders before ultimately reaching consumers. 
Consequently, interdiction of cross-border drug trafficking forms a critical component of the European Union’s 
initiative to reduce drug supplies. However, there is contradictory evidence about its effectiveness, which is due, 
in part, to a paucity of information about how drugs flow across borders. This study uses a network approach to 
analyze international drug trafficking both to and within Europe, drawing on several perspectives to delineate the 
factors that affect how drug shipments move across borders. The analysis explicates how drug trafficking is 
concentrated along specific routes; moreover, we demonstrate that its structure is not random but, rather, driven 
by specific factors. In particular, corruption and social and geographical proximity are key factors explaining the 
configuration of heroin supply to European countries. This study also provides essential insights into the disruption 
of traffickers’ illicit activities. 
Keywords   drug trafficking, network analysis, heroin. 
Introduction 
Illicit drugs, especially heroin and cocaine, travel across multiple borders before reaching consumer 
markets (Caulkins, 2015). Although, in principle, drug traffickers have a plethora of suitable routes 
through which to move illicit drugs, in actuality, drug trafficking is concentrated along specific routes, 
as countries generally have a limited number of trading partners (Boivin, 2013, 2014a; European 
Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction [EMCDDA] & EUROPOL, 2013; United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC], 2015d). In this critical respect, the international trade network 
of illicit drugs is indeed less dense than that which pertains to legal commodities (Boivin, 2013, 2014a). 
The concentration of drug trafficking along a few specific routes follows well-established trends of 
other forms of criminal behavior. Indeed, an extensive corpus of criminological literature now 
demonstrates how crime is not uniformly distributed and some areas have higher crime rates than others 
(Curman, Andresen, & Brantingham, 2014; Sherman, Gartin, & Buerger, 1989; Weisburd & Amram, 
2014; Weisburd, Groff, & Yang, 2012). These findings form the cornerstone of the so-called hot-spot 
policing approach (Weisburd, 2015). The underlying logic of this approach is that law enforcement 
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resources should be concentrated within the areas where crime most commonly occurs (Sherman et al., 
1998). Several studies went one step further and identified the characteristics of these “hot” areas (Eck, 
Clarke, & Guerette, 2007; Smith, Frazee, & Davison, 2000; Weisburd et al., 2012; Wikström, 2012), 
establishing how socioeconomic (e.g., low income, ethnic heterogeneity, residential instability) and 
physical features (e.g., land use and presence of risky facilities) of places can help us account for crime 
concentration. Such research was invaluable in terms of providing an evidence-base from which to both 
efficiently manage police resources and design social interventions aimed at tackling the root causes of 
crime (Weisburd, Groff, & Yang, 2013). 
The disruption of illicit drug trafficking, both within the European Union (EU) and along its external 
borders, constitutes a key priority of the EU Drugs Strategy (2013-2020; Council of the European Union, 
2012). Yet, evidence pertaining to the effectiveness of current interdiction programs is contradictory at 
best (Collins, 2014). For example, traffickers adapt to interdiction programs by either changing their 
modes of transportation and hiding techniques, or shifting to alternative routes (Friesendorf, 2005; 
Manski, Pepper, & Thomas, 1999; Reuter, 2014; Seccombe, 1995; Windle & Farrell, 2012). The latter 
form of adaptation is often referred to as the “balloon effect,” and suggests that stronger law enforcement 
actions in one location will result in the displacement of drug trafficking activities to another location 
(Friesendorf, 2005; Hawdon & Kleiman, 2011; Reuter, 2014). The balloon analogy derives from the 
similarity between this dynamic and that of incompressible fluids that move toward areas of lower 
resistance when under pressure (Mora, 1996). Consequently, eradications, seizures, and other drug 
control interventions taking place in one country may damage others if coordination schemes are scant 
(Chouvy, 2012; Mora, 1996; Reuter, 2014). The emergence of a supply route of cocaine to Europe via 
Africa following the instantiation of increased level of controls between the Netherlands and the 
Netherlands Antilles is a recent example which testifies to the notorious balloon effect and the limits of 
interdiction programs (Reuter, 2014; UNODC, 2007, 2013). 
The concentration of drug trafficking along specific routes also suggests that traffickers are driven by 
specific motives (Boivin, 2014a; Reuter, 2014; UNODC, 2015c). The understanding of how and why 
crime focuses within particular areas proved to be integral to the introduction of new criminal justice 
and social interventions aimed at reducing crime. Similarly, one would think that gaining insights into 
the concentration of drug trafficking along specific routes could also aid efforts to identify the most 
effective counter-policies, evaluate the consequences of interdiction programs, and anticipate the 
possible displacement of traffickers’ illicit activities because of such programs. However, there has 
hitherto been a dearth of empirical research investigating which factors shape the geographic 
configuration of international drug trafficking and why it concentrates along a specific and limited range 
of paths (Trumbore & Woo, 2014). 
The present contribution investigates the determinants of the geopolitical configuration of heroin 
supply to European countries. It draws from several disciplines (i.e., criminology, macroeconomics, and 
geography) to explain what factors determine how drug shipments move across countries. The reason 
for our focus on the trafficking of heroin to Europe is twofold. First, heroin consumption still accounts 
for a large share of drug-related health and social costs in Europe (EMCDDA, 2015). For example, 40 
experts from across the EU recently judged heroin to be the most harmful illicit psychoactive substance 
in Europe, as well as the second most harmful overall with respect to 16 harm criteria (van Amsterdam, 
Nutt, Phillips, & van den Brink, 2015). The purity of the heroin available in certain European markets, 
and therefore its potential harm, is increasing alongside the number of overdose deaths (EMCDDA, 
2015). Second, Europe has a large availability of country-level data. As concluded in the first European 
Conference on Drug Supply Indicators, “. . . a considerable amount of data on drug supply is already 
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being collected in a systematic way across the EU, and the way forward is to build on what already 
exists . . .” (EMCDDA, 2010, p. 7). Despite this article’s focus, the methodological approach can be 
replicated and adapted to other geographic areas, illicit substances (e.g., cocaine, cannabis), and illicit 
markets (e.g., trafficking in human beings). 
The article is structured as follows. The section “Theoretical Perspective on International Drug 
Trafficking” reviews literature on the manifold factors that shape international drug trafficking, in 
addition to outlining the theoretical framework. The section “Data and Method” introduces the empirical 
methodology, before proceeding to discuss the data; the analytical strategy mobilized in the article; and 
its limitations. The section “Results and Discussion” presents and discusses the results. The article 
concludes by delineating the emergent research and policy implications. 
Theoretical Perspective on International Drug Trafficking 
Current knowledge of the various factors underpinning the geopolitical configuration of transnational 
drug trafficking routes is limited, both theoretically and empirically—in fact, it is practically absent in 
the latter instance (von Lampe, 2012). While a range of authors, such as Caulkins, Crawford, and Reuter 
(1993); Akyeampong (2005); Decker and Townsend-Chapman (2008); Paoli and Reuter (2008); and 
Kleemans (2013), provide some valuable insights, there is neither a systematic knowledge-base nor an 
established framework from which to explicate the geographical configuration of transnational drug 
trafficking routes. The contribution by Reuter (2014) centers on three models and marks the sole attempt 
to systematically organize knowledge about how smugglers choose drug routes. 
The first model is founded upon the idea that the costs imposed by law enforcement authorities, such 
as loss of shipments, confiscation of assets, and, more importantly, incarceration, are the principal costs 
for drug traffickers (Caulkins & Reuter, 1998; Kuziemko & Levitt, 2004; Reuter & Kleiman, 1986). 
Resultantly, the more national law enforcement agencies increase these costs, the less attractive a 
country will be (Reuter, 2014). 
The second model identifies geographical proximity to the main producer or consumer countries as 
an important risk factor for becoming a transhipment country, as traveling long distances increases 
transportation costs as well as the risk of interception and arrest (Reuter, 2014). As Reuter (2014) pointed 
out, the proximity of both Mexico to the United States and the Balkan countries to Western Europe is a 
crucial factor in their pivotal role in the trafficking of cocaine and heroin, respectively. 
In the third model, Reuter (2014) argues that social ties among countries, such as migration patterns, 
may shape drug trafficking routes. With regard to the drug trade in Western Europe, for example, Paoli 
and Reuter (2008) found that Turkish and Albanians dominate both the import and retail distribution of 
heroin, whereas Colombians have a leading role in the import of cocaine from South America. Along 
with the relative proximity to production or key trafficking countries, a large immigrant diaspora in 
several European countries is a common trait of these ethnic groups. In a similar vein, Nigerian 
traffickers are now increasingly playing an important role in the trafficking of cocaine. Despite Nigeria’s 
distance from any significant producer or consumer country, the migration of 3 million Nigerians to 
Southeast Asia, the United States, Latin America, and Europe goes some way to helping us explain this 
emergent dynamic (Paoli & Reuter, 2008). Although easy access to suppliers and fertile ground for 
corruption may constitute a competitive advantage to be exploited in transnational drug trafficking 
activities, other authors stress the relevance of diasporas and social networks as crucial assets for 
transnational crimes in general (Bruinsma & Bernasco, 2004; Kleemans & van De Bunt, 1999; Soudijn 
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& Kleemans, 2009; van Duyne, 1993) and drug trafficking specifically (Akyeampong, 2005; Zaitch, 
2002).  
This study, following the aforesaid framework elaborated by Reuter (2014), develops three 
hypotheses for the purposes of understanding the geopolitical configuration of the international supply 
of heroin to Europe. The first hypothesis relates to the claim that the routes offering high economic 
returns and low risks of interception are more likely to be used to traffic drugs. The “risks and prices” 
model developed by Reuter and Kleiman (1986) postulates that traffickers are rational actors who seek 
to maximize profits and reduce risks. According to this perspective, countries imposing lower costs, 
namely, a lower risk of interception and higher profits for traffickers, should be more likely to import 
and/or export heroin. Similarly, corrupt officials reduce the risk of interception and thus facilitate drug 
trafficking, although bribing custom officers may represent initial costs for traffickers (Desroches, 2007; 
Greenfield & Paoli, 2012; Van Dijk, 2007; Trumbore & Woo, 2014). Boivin (2014b) found that price 
markups tend to be lower in destination countries with high levels of corruption. This confirms that the 
monetary costs for bribing custom officials are lower than the non-monetary costs of a higher risk of 
arrest or seizure (Reuter & Kleiman, 1986). 
The second hypothesis states that heroin flows are more likely to occur within countries that are 
geographically close to each other. As Reuter (2014) noted, geographic proximity can reduce the costs 
associated with drug trafficking. Indeed, several studies have documented the negative effect of 
geographic distance on legal trade. In a meta-analysis of 103 studies, Disdier and Head (2008) found 
that a 10% increase in distance lowers legal trade by about 9%. The effect of geographic distance on 
illegal trade is even larger. Caulkins and Bond (2012) calculated that the price of marijuana in the United 
States increased by about US$325 to US$475 per pound per 1,000 miles of distance from Mexico. As 
traffickers operate under the threat of law enforcement authorities, longer distances involve longer 
exposure to risk of interception and arrest. 
The third hypothesis predicts that countries that are socially closer are more likely to be connected to 
each other than countries that are not. As Reuter (2014) argued, besides geography, certain social factors, 
such as migration flow between two countries, may facilitate trafficking between them. Several studies 
in macroeconomics, for example, point out that social proximity between countries reduces the barriers 
for legal trade by providing opportunities for businesses and easier access to valuable information 
(Ghemawat, 2001; Prashantham, Dhanaraj, & Kumar, 2015; Rauch, 1999; Sgrignoli, Metulini, Schiavo, 
& Riccaboni, 2015). Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the effect of social proximity would also 
apply to illegal trading, inasmuch as participants cannot rely on legal institutions to solve their disputes. 
That is to say, traffickers need to agree on quantity, purity, conditions of the shipment, and payment. 
They may also need to deal with unexpected and hostile situations (i.e., seizure of the shipment) where 
the two parties need to find a common solution (Lameli, Nitsch, Südekum, & Wolf, 2013). Speaking 
the same language, sharing the same sociocultural background, or coming from the same institutional 
setting increase trust in the partner and reduce transaction costs (Combes, Lafourcade, & Mayer, 2005; 
Kleemans & van De Bunt, 1999; Paoli & Reuter, 2008). 
Language and cultural affinity facilitate cross-border transactions by providing traders with the 
opportunity to rely on non-economic, sociocultural factors (e.g., reputation and trust of suppliers, ethnic 
ties) to find international partners and to reduce uncertainties in trading (Lee & Park, 2016; Sgrignoli et 
al., 2015). As observed in legal trading, preexisting ties are a determinant factor during the search for a 
trading partner, and informal networks also play a key role in shaping international trade (Rauch, 1999). 
For example, informal networks may sanction violations of the trafficking agreements by blacklisting 
the deviant partner and excluding him or her from future deals (Rauch & Trindade, 2002). Especially in 
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the context of illicit industries, preexisting ties rather than market-driven reasons (i.e., profits or 
dimension of the market) may lead to the decision to export to specific countries.  
Data and method 
The Heroin Trafficking Network 
Following the work of Paoli, Greenfield, and Reuter (2009), this study conceives of international drug 
trafficking as a series of trading relations among countries. Although the authors do not use network 
analysis techniques, they employ a framework and terminology (e.g., “flow model”) in line with this 
approach. This is also consistent with other researchers who have subsequently utilized a social network 
approach to study the international trafficking of illicit drugs (Boivin, 2013, 2014a, 2014b; Chandra & 
Joba, 2015). 
Data on heroin trafficking network to and within Europe derive from seizure cases reported in the 
UNODC individual drug seizure (IDS) database that contains information about the origin, transit, and 
destination of shipments seized (Boivin, 2011, 2013, 2014b; UNODC, 2015c). This information is used 
to identify the pairs of countries exporting and importing heroin with each other and, in turn, to establish 
the position of each country in the international heroin trafficking network. Table 1 reports an example 
of the IDS data set structure. 
The heroin trade network includes all European countries for which data are currently available (N = 
36) and all non-European countries (N = 25) who import from or export to Europe, according to seizure 
cases that occurred between 2007 and 2012 (UNODC, 2014a).1 For instance, a seizure of heroin destined 
for Italy occurring on the border between Slovenia and Croatia provides evidence for two connections: 
first, between Italy and Slovenia, and, second, between Croatia and Slovenia (Boivin, 2013). 
The IDS database provides 10,378 different dyads determining 325 pairs of countries.2 In 138 of these 
325 cases, the connection accounts for less than 1% of the seizures taking place as the goods were being 
imported into the country. These connections are likely to represent weak or sporadic links between 
countries and, consequently, are not included within our analysis here. The final network corresponds 
to 187 pairs of countries. 
Table 1. Example of the IDS Data Set Structure Between 2007 and 2012.  
Country Date 
Quantity 
(kg) 
Producing 
country Departure country Destination country 
The United 
Kingdom 
April 22, 2011 130 Afghanistan Pakistan The United Kingdom 
Pakistan October 9, 2011 15 Afghanistan Pakistan Belgium 
… … … … … … 
Bulgaria February 19, 2010 86  Bulgaria The Netherlands 
Spain August 18, 2010 18  Belgium Spain 
… … … … … … 
Portugal October 1, 2009 23  The Netherlands Portugal 
Pakistan January 17, 2009 18 Afghanistan Pakistan Nigeria 
Pakistan March 26, 2009 8.5 Afghanistan Pakistan The United Kingdom 
Spain March 29, 2007 7 Afghanistan Turkey Spain 
… … … … … … 
Source. UNODC 2014b.  
Note. IDS = individual drug seizure; UNODC = United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. 
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Independent variables 
This study uses both nodal and relational attributes data to understand what factors make up the 
European heroin trafficking network. Nodal attributes refer to specific features of importing countries, 
such as the level of corruption, whereas relational attributes provide information about the links between 
any two given countries (e.g., number of migrants from one country to another). Table 2 reports the 
independent variables used in the analysis along with the source, reference period, and nature of the 
variable (i.e., nodal or relational attribute). 
According to our first hypothesis, traffickers are more likely to ship drugs to countries where there 
are lower risks of interception or higher profits are likely to be procured. The study operationalizes the 
concept of risk in terms of law enforcement and corruption; profits are operationalized in terms of price 
markups and market size. It is important to note that measuring the level of enforcement across countries 
presents several issues. First, data on drug-related arrests are generated by national legal systems and 
thus differ dramatically across countries. Second, offenses can be registered at different stages (e.g., 
when reported to law enforcement agencies, after investigation), notwithstanding that countries may use 
different thresholds to discern sales from personal use and employ different counting rules (Kilmer, 
Reuter, & Giommoni, 2015). Finally, and most importantly, there are no available data on drug-related 
offenses for several of the countries included within this analysis. 
Given the limitations of trying to use proxies for the level of enforcement across countries, a twofold 
approach is adopted here. The first uses the presence of police forces (rate per 100,000 population) and 
seizure rate (quantity of heroin seized per 100,000 population) in each country as nodal attributes with 
which to proxy law enforcement capacity, to arrest traffickers, and to intercept shipments (Boivin, 
2014b; Keefer, Loayza, & Soares, 2008; Soares, 2004). The second approach substitutes the police rate 
for the law and order index from the International Country Risk Guide (The PRS Group, Inc., 2015). 
This index measures both the impartiality of the legal system and the ability of a country to effectively 
enforce the law. The index ranges from 1 (weak level of law and order) to 6 (high level of law and 
order). Hernandez and Rudolph (2015) used the law and order index as a proxy for the level of 
enforceability and found that it is related negatively to human trafficking flows. The hypothesis that 
corruption facilitates drug exchanges between countries is tested by introducing into the model the level 
of corruption as measured by the World Bank, that is, perceptions of the extent to which public power 
is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption.3 
Profit maximization is taken into account by including within the model the differences in wholesale 
prices between any two countries (measured in US$/kg) and the number of heroin users in importing 
countries.4 Both variables serve as a proxy for the economic-driven behavior of traffickers. Whereas the 
former looks at higher return per unit sold, the latter tests whether countries with a higher demand tend 
to import heroin from a higher number of trading partners.  
The model also includes two matrices of spatial proximity for the purposes of testing how 
geographical distance influences illicit trafficking. The first matrix measures the distance between two 
countries, while taking into consideration the actual distribution of the population within the respective 
nations (Mayer & Zignago, 2011).5 The second matrix controls for countries that share a common 
border, a condition that might provide traffickers with lower risk when attempting to move drugs across 
land rather than by air or sea, which are usually subject to higher controls (Reuter, 2014).  
Finally, three relational variables are used to test to what extent social proximity facilitates drug 
trafficking between any two given countries. Several studies in macroeconomics identify migration, 
common language, and past colonial relationships as primary social factors affecting legal trade (Frankel 
& Rose, 2002; Ghemawat, 2001; Lameli et al., 2013; Lee & Park, 2016; Rauch, 1999; Sgrignoli et al., 
 7 
2015). Their effect is tested by considering migration flows among the 61 countries included within the 
analysis, the presence of a language spoken by at least 9% of the population in any pair of countries, 
and historical colonial relationships among countries. Migration data from the United Nations Global 
Migration Database (UNGMD) report the number (“stock”) of international migrants, for each country, 
in relation to their country of origin. Data on common language and historical colonial relationships 
derive from the Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales (CEPII). 
Table 2. Independent Variables. 
Dimension Variable Source Period Typea 
Risk of enforcement Police agents, rate per 100,000 population UNODC 2009-2012 
(average) 
N 
Seizures, rate on 100,000 population Authors’ elaboration on 
UNODC data 
2009-2012 
(average) 
N 
Control of corruption World Bank 2009-2012 
(average) 
N 
Law and order index International Country Risk 
Guide 
2015 N 
Profits Wholesale price markups Authors’ elaboration on 
UNODC data 
2009-2012 
(average) 
R 
Users UNODC 2009-2012 N 
Geographic distance Border adjacency CEPII NA R 
Weighted distance CEPII NA R 
Social distance Migrants UNGMD 2010 R 
Language spoken by at least 9% of the 
population 
CEPII 2000-2008 R 
Colonial relationship CEPII NA R 
Source. Authors’ elaboration. 
Note. UNODC = United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime; CEPII = Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales; 
UNGMD = United Nations Global Migration Database. 
aN = nodal attribute data; R = relational attribute data. 
Exponential Random Graph Models (ERGMs) 
ERGMs are a class of statistical models for networks that allow for the prediction of the probability of 
tie formation based on a set of covariates (nodal and relational attribute data) and the properties of the 
network itself (Robins, Pattison, Kalish, & Lusher, 2007). These models formulate the probability of 
observing a set of connections as follows: 
𝑃(𝑌 = 𝑦|𝑋) = exp⁡[𝜃𝑇𝑔(𝑦, 𝑋)]/𝑘(𝜃) 
where 𝑌 is the set of edges in a network, 𝑦 is a particular given set of edges, 𝑋 represents a matrix of 
attributes for the vertices in the network, 𝑔(𝑦, 𝑋) a vector of network statistics, 𝜃 corresponds to the 
vector of coefficients, and 𝑘(𝜃) a normalizing constant (Goodreau, Handcock, Hunter, Butts, & Morris, 
2008). Both dyad independence models and dyad dependence models—that is, those controlling for 
higher order inter-dependencies between countries—are estimated (Robins et al., 2007). 
Most statistical models assume that all observations are conditionally independent. Yet, “when 
modelling international trade the assumption of conditional independence is difficult to sustain even in 
the presence of directed country or dyad fixed effects” (Ward, Ahlquist, & Rozenas, 2013, p. 96). 
ERGMs enable researchers to take into account inter-dependencies among observations, including 
higher order dependencies, that is, reciprocity, transitivity, balance, and clusterability (Wasserman & 
Faust, 1994). To cite an example, transitivity encapsulates the logic that the “friend of a friend is a 
friend.” Henceforth, if country i trades with country j, and country j trades with country k, then the 
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probability of a flow of goods between i and k is greater than that between i and a fourth country that 
has no prior or preexisting trade relationship. 
ERGMs take into account dependencies among observations by including parameters for endogenous 
structural effects, such as reciprocity, transitivity, and the distribution of incoming and outgoing ties in 
the trafficking network. A parameter for mutual dyads (MUTUALS) captures the probability of 
reciprocal ties between any two given countries. Two terms are added to account for transitivity in the 
network: geometrically weighted dyadwise shared partners (GWDSP) and geometrically weighted 
edgewise shared partners (GWESP). They represent twopaths and transitive triads, respectively. 
Geometrically weighted in-degree (GWIDEGREE) and out-degree (GWODEGREE) are included to 
capture the skewed distribution of ties among countries. These parameters aid us in our attempt to 
capture processes influenced by the characteristics of the network and, in turn, limit the problem of 
model degeneracy (Hunter, 2007; Hunter & Handcock, 2006). 
The study adopts an iterative development model to identify the combination of variables that best fit 
the data (Goodreau, Kitts, & Morris, 2009; Papachristos, Hureau, & Braga, 2013). The suitability of the 
models is assessed through comparing the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and by performing 
goodness-of-fit checks outlined in the work of Hunter, Goodreau, and Handcock (2008). The analyses 
are performed using the Statnet suite of packages (Handcock et al., 2016; Handcock, Hunter, Butts, 
Goodreau, & Morris, 2008) for R (R Core Team, 2016). 
Limits 
This study begins to construct the heroin trafficking network by utilizing information from the UNODC 
IDS data set. However, it is important to note that UN member states only submit information about 
relevant seizure cases on a voluntary basis (Boivin, 2014b). Consequently, some countries may not 
report information, resulting in a lack of particular connections in the network (Boivin, 2011). By using 
data spanning across several years (2007-2012) and by focusing specifically on European countries, 
which tend to provide more information than non-European ones, we hope to reduce the risk of omitting 
significant links. Having said this, the network can only ever be partial and incomplete, lacking in both 
minor connections and important ones. Most notably, the network neglects the pivotal role of Russia as 
a transhipment point to Central Europe, due to the paucity of information provided by Russia and its 
neighboring countries (i.e., Belarus, Ukraine, and Estonia). 
Other potential biases derive from misunderstandings during the compilation of the IDS by UN 
member states. Specifically, there is an observed tendency for officers to sometimes indicate the last 
country for which they can track the shipment, which, of course, can be different from the last country 
from which the heroin actually flowed (Boivin, 2011). That said, a careful check of the information of 
each seizure case may add to the meaningfulness of the analysis, but it does not guarantee the reliability 
of the original information. 
The network under analysis also considers if two countries export/import heroin from each other, but 
it does not take into account the amount of drug which is traded, thus ignoring a critical element of the 
complexity of drug trafficking. However, this modeling of the network reduces the potential bias 
stemming from the non-uniformity of reporting on significant seizures. Indeed, including quantities may 
upwardly inflate the role of exporter for countries with a higher interception rate. The only way in which 
this bias would affect this analysis is if some countries tend to enforce more along certain borders than 
others.6 
The operationalization of the independent variables also raises several concerns. First, the rate of 
police officials may not serve as an appropriate proxy for the level of enforcement against the supply of 
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drugs. That is to say, police officials are employed for manifold duties besides enforcing the supply of 
illicit drugs, not to mention that higher numbers of police officials do not necessarily equate to better 
policing performance. However, we wish to note that several other studies have used this variable to 
estimate the risk of interception given the lack of better proxies at a cross-national level (Boivin, 2014a; 
Keefer et al., 2008; Soares, 2004). Similarly, seizure rate is not a straightforward indicator of the level 
of interdiction, as seizures are an outcome of several factors including quantity of drug supplied, 
interdiction, and the care taken by traffickers (Kilmer & Hoorens, 2010; Kilmer et al., 2015; MacCoun 
& Reuter, 2001). Disentangling the effects of these complex factors is at this present moment simply 
not possible. The introduction of the law and order index, which aims to measure the capability of 
institutions to monitor illicit activities, represents one such concerted attempt to corroborate the results 
about the effect of law enforcement on international drug trafficking. However, as with the aforesaid 
variables, the law and order index does not specifically assess enforcement against the supply of illicit 
drugs but, rather, the institution’s overall performance. 
The illegality of the heroin market makes it incredibly difficult to collect reliable data on the number 
of users and pricing (Reuter & Greenfield, 2001). Such data collection issues are exacerbated yet further 
when extended to cross-country analysis, as estimates may reflect both differences across countries and 
countries’ idiosyncratic data collection methods. Such factors introduce cross-country comparability 
issues and, ultimately, affect the analysis (Kilmer et al., 2015). With respect to the number of heroin 
consumers, the adoption of the total number of estimated users reduces the bias introduced by different 
estimate methods of the drugs prevalence. Kilmer et al. (2015) and UNODC (2015c) provided detailed 
discussions about the limits and potential biases caused by the use of such data. 
Results and Discussion 
The trafficking network (Figure 1) is composed of 61 nodes (countries) and 187 edges or links that 
correspond to 5% of all possible edges (a density equal to 0.05).7 Table 3 reports some descriptive 
statistics of the heroin trafficking network from, to, and within Europe. As in previous studies (Boivin, 
2013, 2014a), the heroin trafficking network shows a relatively low density; that is, traffickers 
concentrate on traversing a limited range of specific routes. On average, each country imports heroin 
from three other countries (i.e., in-degree) and has trading relations with six other countries in the 
network. 
The two graphs in Figure 2 show the distribution of incoming (i.e., imports) and outgoing (i.e., 
exports) ties. In-degree and out-degree scores are not equally distributed among the nodes, and the 
network is more centralized in terms of out-degree rather than in-degree centrality; a small number of 
countries export to a plethora of other countries, whereas the majority have only one or a few trading 
partners to export to. This suggests that some countries have a hub role within international heroin 
trafficking, whereas others are only involved in it as transit countries due to their geographic location 
along major trafficking routes. Pakistan (out-degree = 26), Turkey (22), and Bulgaria (15) are the 
countries with the largest number of outgoing ties. This is due to their relative proximity to Afghanistan, 
which is the largest opium producer in the world and the point of origin for the vast majority of illicit 
opiates flowing to Europe (UNODC, 2015c, 2015d).  
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Table 3. Network Statistics. 
Measures Statistics 
Size 61 
Edge count 187 
Density 0.051 
Mean degree 6.131 
Mean in-degree 3.066 
In-degree centralization 0.185 
Out-degree centralization 0.389 
Flow betweenness centralization 0.161 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The heroin trafficking network to Europe. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. In-degree and out-degree distribution of the heroin trafficking network. 
Some researchers report the involvement of African countries in the export of heroin from Asia to 
North America (Ellis, 2009; UNODC, 2010), and more recently to Europe (UNODC, 2015a). Large 
seizures have been recorded only between Nigeria and France, and between Kenya and Switzerland, 
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which would suggest that African countries have not attracted substantial heroin trafficking in the period 
of 2007-2012.  
Seizure cases show only residual levels of heroin flow from American countries to Europe. The sole 
links identified in this path connect Bolivia with Ecuador and Spain. Heroin flows from Europe to the 
Americas are also scarce and targeted mainly at Canada. This confirms findings from previous studies 
that there is a degree of separation between the European and the American markets (Ciccarone, 2009; 
UNODC, 2015d). Mexico, Colombia, and Guatemala have jointly provided the majority of heroin 
targeted at the large U.S. market, as well as other minor markets in the region (Astorga & Shirk, 2010; 
Ciccarone, 2009; Office of National Drug Control Policy [ONDCP], 2016; UNODC, 2015d). 
The number of incoming ties is more homogeneous among the countries included in this network (in-
degree centralization = 0.185). Generally, countries import heroin from either one or, at most, a few 
trade partners. However, differences among countries exist which confirm important asymmetries in 
their role within the heroin market (UNODC, 2014a). Countries at the end of the supply chain have 
much higher in-degree scores (i.e., number of incoming ties). These include Spain (in-degree = 14), 
Austria (10), Germany (8), and Denmark (8), which confirms both their role as importers and the 
necessity of satisfying their internal demand. 
Statistics pertaining to the flow betweenness centralization support the validity of the strategy used 
to model the international heroin network. Flow betweenness centrality accounts for all of the times a 
node is located on a path between any two other nodes (Borgatti, 2005), and it identifies the countries 
favoring opiate flows, that is, transit countries. As reported in Table 3, flow betweenness centralization 
is relatively low, which indicates that some countries do indeed have a hub position, but this role is 
shared by various countries rather than being centralized. Countries with the highest flow betweenness 
scores include Germany, the Netherlands, and Turkey. Turkey is the natural geographical connection 
point between Western Asia and Europe. Most of the heroin shipments move through Turkey before 
splitting off into the three alternative branches which constitute the Balkan route (i.e., Northern, 
Southern, and Western branches; UNODC, 2014a). Several reports have also highlighted the relevance 
of the Netherlands as a redistribution center for the heroin arriving from the Balkan route and the cocaine 
from South America, due, in part, to its densely trafficked ports and airports (Farrell, 1998; Lahaie, 
Janssen, & Cadet-Taïrou, 2016; Savona & Riccardi, 2015; UNODC, 2014a). Germany is located in the 
middle of Europe and hosts a large Turkish migrant community that is primarily involved in the import 
of heroin to Europe from South East Europe (Paoli & Reuter, 2008). 
Table 4 reports the odds ratio for the ERGMs of the heroin trafficking network.8 Model 1 is the 
baseline model and shows the probability of forming a tie that, without the introduction of any 
predictors, is equal to the network density (5%).9  
Model 2 includes the independent and control variables within the ERGMs. The results show that 
geographic proximity is a crucial factor influencing heroin trade among countries. Countries who share 
a border are 3.4 times more likely to trade heroin with each other. In contrast, the weighted geographic 
distance is not significantly associated with heroin flows among countries. What this suggests is that 
heroin shipments tend to move along land routes, as opposed to air or sea. This is due to the fact that, 
although ships and aircrafts cover longer distances and bypass transhipment countries, they are also 
subject to stricter controls. Heroin trafficking appears to systematically cross several countries before 
reaching consumer markets, increasing the time necessary to move the load to destination and, in turn, 
reducing profits, but, importantly, keeping the level of sophistication of the shipments low and reducing 
the risk of interception and arrest for traffickers. Further research should investigate how these results 
might change when land routes are not a feasible option, as in the case of cocaine flows to Europe, or 
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when the value per volume is lower, as in the case of Chinese counterfeit cigarettes or resin cannabis 
from Morocco. 
The results show that both migration flows and common language have an effect on the way heroin 
moves between countries, whereas prior colonial relationships appear to not be significantly associated 
with it. As is the case with legal trade, paired countries with intense migration flows are also more likely 
to traffic heroin with each other. This confirms findings from previous studies on the influence of 
migration patterns on drug trafficking routes (Akyeampong, 2005; Paoli & Reuter, 2008; Zaitch, 2002). 
For instance, Paoli and Reuter (2008) found that Turkish and Albanian ethnic groups dominate the 
import and retail distribution of heroin in Europe. Despite their predominance, these groups do not act 
as a monolithic bloc but, rather, cooperate or compete with other ethnic groups to smuggle heroin into 
Europe. Criminal groups involved in transnational drug trafficking tend to organize their activities along 
a continuum with large, longlasting, and well-organized groups at one extreme, and small, temporary 
networks of collaborating criminals at the other (Kostakos & Antonopoulos, 2010; Ruggiero & Khan, 
2007; von Lampe, 2013). 
Furthermore, countries where sections of the population speak the same language are 1.9 times more 
likely to traffic heroin. Egger and Lassmann (2012) showed how speaking the same language increases 
trade flows between two countries by 44%. Common language serves as a proxy for a form of cultural 
contiguity between particular countries. Several studies document how common or similar cultural 
arrangements make agreements between trading partners easier (Frankel & Rose, 2002; Lameli et al., 
2013). For example, transaction costs are lower if partners share the same cultural or religious 
background (Combes et al., 2005). This is as valid for drug trafficking as it is for legal trade. Above all, 
cultural proximity provides traffickers with the opportunity to rely on non-economic factors to find 
international partners (e.g., reputation and trust of suppliers, belonging to the same ethnic group). This 
reduces uncertainties in a market that operates “both without and against the state” (Paoli, 2002, p. 64), 
that is, a market whose participants cannot resort to legal authorities to enforce their agreements, and 
are constantly under threat of arrest. 
The inclusion of migration flows and language may go some way to explaining why the colony–
colonizer relationship does not significantly affect the heroin network. According to previous analyses, 
ethnicity and migration patterns are crucial determinants of the international flows of both illicit and 
licit goods (Paoli & Reuter, 2008; Rauch & Trindade, 2002). Language and migration flows can capture 
the effect of culture and ethnicity, and, from an econometric perspective, mitigate the role of past 
colonial relationships in the formation of trading connections. Lameli et al. (2013) examined various 
aspects of linguistic influences on trade, concluding that the principal effect from speaking the same 
language is the promotion of cultural proximity among partners. Migration patterns often overlap with 
colonial relationships. For instance, half of the Colombians who migrated to Europe reside in Spain. 
Consequently, migration flows may account for the movement of people from former colonies to 
colonizer countries, in turn, limiting the effect of colonial relationships in the model. 
Market forces also seem to affect, in part, the heroin trafficking network. That is to say, countries 
with a high demand tend to import heroin from a larger number of countries, while the maximization of 
profits (operationalized in terms of trade price markups) does not seem to affect the formation of a 
trafficking route. The number of heroin users is significantly and positively correlated with the 
probability of forming a tie. For example, the largest Western and Central European markets (i.e., the 
United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Germany), which constitute the bulk of European heroin 
consumption, import from a higher number of countries than most other countries within the network.10 
Large markets provide more business opportunities, which, in turn, attracts more traffickers and drug 
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flows from different trading partners. An alternative explanation is that greater availability of heroin in 
countries along important trafficking routes facilitates its distribution and consumption among the local 
population (Beyrer et al., 2000; United Nations International Drug Control Programme [UNDCP], 
1998). The methodology utilized here does not allow us to definitively identify the direction of the 
causality, and therefore, we must stress that both dynamics may coexist. 
The literature is unanimous concerning the fact that economic profits are the primary driving force of 
drug trafficking (Arlacchi & Lewis, 1990; Chi, Hayatdavoudi, Kruszona, & Rowe, 2013; Desroches, 
2007; Kenney, 2007). However, the results of the current study indicate that gross profits only partially 
affect the structure of the heroin trafficking network. In fact, the influence of indicators of social 
proximity is stronger in this case, thus demonstrating how social and cultural relations are more relevant 
predictors of the formation of heroin trafficking routes than market-driven reasons (i.e., profits; 
Kleemans, 2013). Nonetheless, better connections, faster transactions, and lower risk of detection and 
scams have an economic value that traffickers are likely to take into account when organizing their 
businesses. 
Corruption is positively and significantly associated with the number of incoming ties; the higher the 
level of corruption, the higher the number of connections through which heroin enters the country. For 
each one-unit increase in the level of corruption in the importing country, the likelihood of forming a 
link increases by 1.1 times, when everything else is held constant. Corruption reduces risks and non-
monetary costs, hence providing traffickers with protection against arrests and seizures (Basu, 2014). 
Consequently, it can perhaps be thought of as providing a similar function for the black market that the 
enforceability of contracts does for legal commerce. In the same way that strong institutions protect 
legal and property rights and, in turn, facilitate legal trade, so corrupted officials guarantee the traffickers 
impunity and success in shipping drug loads. 
Previous literature underlines that corruption can increase as a consequence of increased drug flows 
(Boyum & Kleiman, 2001; Chalk, 2011; Corso, Mercy, Simon, Finkelstein, & Miller, 2007; Giraldo, 
1999; Guizado, 2005; Moser, Lister, McIlwaine, Shrader, & Tornqvist, 1999; Singer, 2008; Thoumi, 
2002). The use of a general corruption index, which does not focus on drug-related bribes, suggests that 
corruption has a stronger impact on connections rather than the other way round. 
From a drug policy perspective, the main finding of the study is that the tightness of law enforcement 
actions (police forces and seizures) in a country is ineffective in discouraging the formation of a 
trafficking connection. The robustness of the results is supported in Model 3 by introducing the Crime 
and Order Index from the International Country Risk Guide (The PRS Group, Inc., 2015). The only 
difference between Models 2 and 3 centers on the influence of seizure rates in importing countries. In 
Model 2, seizure rate coefficients are positive and significant; that is, more seizures are associated with 
a larger number of connections in the trafficking network. Countries exposed to larger flows of heroin 
are, in turn, expected to dedicate greater attention to fighting the traffic. Therefore, the positive 
correlation between seizure rates and the presence of heroin flows might be due to the historical 
evolution of drug trafficking and its enforcement in the countries within the network. 
Models 2 and 3 suggest that enforcement does not prevent the formation of drug trafficking flows. 
Reuter and Kleiman’s (1986) “risks and prices” model, used in several drug policy analyses, assumes 
that the risk of arrest and incarceration is the main cost for supplying illicit drugs. However, empirical 
studies show little evidence that additional enforcement might affect the supply of illicit drugs (Pollack 
& Reuter, 2014; Décary-Hétu & Giommoni, 2016). 
As Paoli and colleagues (2009) pointed out, the international supply of opiates cannot be cut, and 
moreover, supply-oriented policies have a limited influence. Besides having a low probability of 
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success, a supply-reduction approach and the imposition of criminal laws for drug-related crimes in 
general may worsen the situation by fueling corruption and violence, and incurring other economic, 
political, and social costs (Calderón, Robles, Díaz-Cayeros, & Magaloni, 2015; Eck & Maguire, 2000; 
Freeman, 2006; Greenfield & Paoli, 2012; Kleiman, 2011; Kleiman, Caulkins, Hawken, & Kilmer, 
2012; MacCoun & Reuter, 2001; Miron, 1999; Osorio, 2015; Paoli et al., 2009; Riley, 1998; Rios, 2013). 
Despite these side effects, law enforcement actions form the cornerstone of antidrug policies in most 
countries (Caulkins & Reuter, 2010; Collins, 2014; Mejía & Restrepo, 2014; Werb et al., 2011). This 
does not mean that a supply-side intervention should not be used but simply that a more harm reduction–
oriented approach, aiming at limiting its side effects, may be more impactful and have longer term 
effects (Greenfield & Paoli, 2012). The results of this study, in particular, suggest that policies centered 
on tackling heroin trafficking in specific regions should primarily focus on neighboring production 
countries and countries with a hub position (i.e., those with several trading partners and/or those 
facilitating drug trade among other countries in the network). 
Finally, the model includes parameters that account for the structure of the network. The parameter 
for mutual dyads shows that there is a 5% probability of reciprocal ties between any two given countries, 
indicating that heroin shipments do not tend to move back and forth between countries but rather flow 
in one direction—from producer to consumer countries. GWIDEGREE and GWODEGREE capture the 
skewed distribution of incoming and outgoing ties among the countries, respectively. The latter shows 
that the probability of forming a new outgoing tie decreases as the number of a country’s already existing 
outgoing links increases. In contrast, GWDSP and GWESP account for the transitivity in the network 
by capturing two-paths and transitive triads. The former is negative and statistically significant, 
indicating that the probability of two countries exchanging heroin via a third country decreases as the 
number of intermediaries already in use increases. The latter is positive and statistically significant, 
indicating that the probability of forming a tie increases when the added edge increases the transitivity 
in the network. What these findings indicate, above all, is that the overall result of drug trafficking 
disruption interventions may vary depending on a country’s role in the network. Tightening controls 
along connections that have alternatives are unlikely to have meaningful side effects for third countries, 
whereas, targeting countries that increase the transitivity in the network may, on the contrary, result in 
the reduction of heroin flows within other markets.  
Most of the relationships investigated above could also, to some extent, be explained in reverse. Some 
of the findings shed light on the association between key variables, but they remain an inadequate ground 
for stronger causal inferences. While the characteristics of the national markets and of drug 
countermeasures influence the structure of the supply, the latter, in turn, is likely to modify the market 
and to shape countering policies. These reverse effects are going to be stronger whenever the 
phenomenon endures over time, as it does in most heroin markets. A country afflicted by pervasive 
corruption, as aforesaid, would tend to attract a higher number of heroin flows. However, at the same 
time, massive drug shipments may lead to increased levels of corruption. Ceteris paribus, the same logic 
applies to the rate of police officers. The lower the level of law enforcement, the higher the likelihood 
of drug flows to a country, yet countries exposed to significant flows of drugs might react with an 
increase in the number of police officers assigned to drug units, thus making the phenomenon more 
complex to interpret. Future studies should include longitudinal analyses to test how robust the results 
are to different specifications. 
  
 
Table 4. OR, 95% CIs, and SE From ERGMs of the Heroin Trade Network. 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
OR (95% CI) SE OR (95% CI) SE OR (95% CI) SE 
Edge statistic 0.054*** [0.046, 0.062] 0.075 0.005*** [0.002, 0.017] 0.577 0.005*** [0.002, 0.018] 0.602 
Police agents   1.000 [1.000, 1.001] 0.000   
Law and order index     1.049 [0.940, 1.171] 0.056 
Seizure rate   0.115*** [0.105, 0.127] 0.049 0.097 [0.008, 1.244] 1.300 
Corruption   1.113* [1.007, 1.231] 0.051 1.115* [1.007, 1.234] 0.052 
(log) Heroin users   1.096* [1.014, 1.186] 0.040 1.094* [1.010, 1.185] 0.041 
Trade price markups   1.000 [1.000, 1.000] 0.000 1.000 [1.000, 1.000] 0.000 
Border adjacency   3.442*** [2.078, 5.700] 0.257 3.489*** [2.108, 5.776] 0.257 
(log) Weighted distance   1.003 [0.946, 1.064] 0.030 0.998 [0.943, 1.057] 0.029 
(log) Migrants   1.180*** [1.128, 1.234] 0.023 1.172*** [1.118, 1.229] 0.024 
Common language   1.908** [1.246, 2.923] 0.218 1.907** [1.245, 2.919] 0.217 
Colony   1.329 [0.637, 2.771] 0.375 1.367 [0.649, 2.876] 0.380 
Mutual   0.060*** [0.014, 0.249] 0.726 0.062*** [0.015, 0.251] 0.718 
GWODEGREE   0.280*** [0.140, 0.559] 0.353 0.277*** [0.138, 0.556] 0.355 
GWIDEGREE   6.242*** [2.302, 16.93] 0.509 7.273** [2.361, 22.41] 0.574 
GWDSP   0.814*** [0.763, 0.868] 0.033 0.815*** [0.764, 0.870] 0.033 
GWESP   3.534*** [2.659, 4.697] 0.145 3.548*** [2.668, 4.718] 0.145 
AIC 1,479 1,101 1,101 
Note. OR = odds ratio; CI = confidence interval; ERGM = exponential random graph model; GWODEGREE = geometrically weighted out-degree; GWIDEGREE = geometrically weighted in-degree; GWDSP 
= geometrically weighted dyadwise shared partners; GWESP = geometrically weighted edgewise shared partners; AIC = Akaike information criterion. 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
 
 
  
Conclusion 
This study confirms that both drug trafficking clusters along specific routes and its structure is not 
random but, in actual fact, driven by specific factors. Specifically, risks, profits, and geographic and 
social proximity affect the configuration of heroin supplied to European countries. 
The study proves that there is a strong overlap between the determinants of legal and illegal trade. 
Geographic and social proximity affect drug trafficking in much the same way that they affect licit trade 
flows. Geographic distance increases the risk of interception, as well as transportation and 
communication costs. Hence, two countries sharing a border are more likely to trade in heroin, because 
the imminent proximity reduces both the level of organization needed to ship the drug and the 
complexity of trafficking in general. Social proximity is also an essential driver of the structure of 
international trafficking routes. Several studies have identified drug trafficking as an inefficient 
business, due, in part, to working without the protection of any legal authority and the risk of arrest 
(Paoli, 2002; Reuter, 1985). Hence, social proximity is a valuable resource for finding business 
counterparts, procuring access to strategic information, and in terms of settling disputes and reducing 
uncertainties. 
This article offers several key insights for law enforcement authorities and policy makers. Interdiction 
programs have accounted for a large share of drug control expenditure in recent years (Babor et al., 
2010; EMCDDA, 2008). Indeed, even countries with lenient regulations for the drug market—that is, 
the Netherlands—invest most of their budgets in tackling the supply of illicit drugs (Rigter, 2006). It is 
our contention that the stated priority of the EU Drugs Strategy (2013-2020) to disrupt the international 
supply of illicit drugs would be better achieved by employing strategies aimed at reducing corruption 
and consumer demand for heroin, rather than focusing on stricter enforcement of the supply. Increasing 
resilience against corruption would reduce the porousness of borders and prevent countries from 
becoming a part of main trafficking routes. At the same time, it would also help to decrease the costs 
stemming from the militarization of borders and the war on drugs (i.e., reduction in trade efficiency, 
violence, and mass incarceration). Similarly, demand control programs trying to cut heroin consumption 
by reducing the number of users and/or the quantity of the drug which they consume—such as via opioid 
substitution therapies—may discourage the formation of drug trafficking routes. 
These recommendations do not imply that supply-side interventions should simply be abandoned; 
rather, we are proposing that the authorities should take a more problem-oriented approach. Law 
enforcement authorities should focus their interdiction programs on specific connections: those 
identified in the network and those that, according to the parameters identified here (i.e., geographic 
proximity, common language, and migration pattern), are more likely to become trafficking routes. As 
for hot-spot policing, drug enforcement should concentrate on the same areas where drug trafficking 
occurs. 
The findings of this study can also help to develop risk assessment models, which aid our ability to 
predict the balloon effect. As the literature demonstrates, if authorities clamp down against specific 
connections, then traffickers displace to alternative routes. Interdiction in one country can have direct 
consequences for another; hence, policy makers who are planning a major crackdown should consider 
the potential effects of doing so on other countries. The parameters identified in this study can be used 
to predict where traffickers are more likely to displace to. This would help to prevent or, at the very 
 17 
least, reduce the balloon effect and, more importantly, strengthen the effect of the crackdown on illicit 
drug trafficking flows. 
This study represents the first empirical attempt to understand which factors explain the formation of 
drug trafficking routes. Although, as demonstrated, it already provides expedient insights and 
recommendations, further work is required to aid law enforcement and border guards working on the 
ground. In particular, future research should focus on the concentration of drug trafficking at local level 
and include information about the mode of transportation of drug shipments. This is because evidence 
suggests that drug trafficking also concentrates at a micro level (Rengert, Chakravorty, Bole, & 
Henderson, 2000; Rengert, Ratcliffe, & Chakravorty, 2005). A geospatial network analysis, which 
combines information on the international drug trafficking network and its geographical concentration 
at a micro level, could therefore provide critical information for law enforcement authorities. When 
paired with information about the means of transportation of drug loads, it may be crucial in terms of 
developing a problem-oriented approach to disrupt international drug trafficking. 
Appendix 
Table A1. Countries of the Heroin Trade Network. 
Country Country code 
Afghanistan AFG 
Albania ALB 
United Arab Emirates ARE 
Australia AUS 
Austria AUT 
Belgium BEL 
Bulgaria BGR 
Bahrain BHR 
Bosnia and Herzegovina BIH 
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) BOL 
Brazil BRA 
Canada CAN 
Switzerland CHE 
Czech Republic CZE 
Germany DEU 
Denmark DNK 
Dominican Republic DOM 
Ecuador ECU 
Spain ESP 
Finland FIN 
France FRA 
The United Kingdom GBR 
Greece GRC 
Croatia HRV 
Hungary HUN 
India IND 
Ireland IRL 
Iran (Islamic Republic of) IRN 
Iceland ISL 
Italy ITA 
Japan JPN 
Kazakhstan KAZ 
Kenya KEN 
Kyrgyzstan KGZ 
Kosovo under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 KOS 
Lebanon LBN 
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Luxembourg LUX 
Latvia LVA 
Macedonia (the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) MKD 
Malta MLT 
Montenegro MNE 
Mauritius MUS 
Nigeria NGA 
The Netherlands NLD 
Norway NOR 
Oman OMN 
Pakistan PAK 
Poland POL 
Portugal PRT 
Qatar QAT 
Romania ROM 
Russian Federation RUS 
Serbia SRB 
Slovakia SVK 
Slovenia SVN 
Sweden SWE 
Thailand THA 
Tajikistan TJK 
Turkey TUR 
Ukraine UKR 
Uzbekistan UZB 
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Notes 
1. Table A1 in the appendix lists the 61 countries that form the heroin trafficking network under analysis. Countries are 
labeled as European according to the macro geographic regions used by the United Nations (United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime [UNODC], 2015b). 
2. The 10,378 dyads often involve the same two countries. Removing the duplicates, we obtain 325 dyads. 
3. The control of corruption index ranges from 2.5 (weak control) to +2.5 (strong control). The reciprocal of the index is 
used in the analysis so that higher values indicate higher corruption levels. 
4. The number of users is derived from the prevalence of illicit opiate use times the population of the corresponding age 
group, usually 15 to 64. These data are collected from the UNODC (2014a) and the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs 
and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA; 2015). 
5. The distance between countries is based on Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales (CEPII) 
weighted distance that calculates bilateral distances between the biggest cities of any two countries, and weights inter-city 
distances by the share of the city in the country’s overall population (Mayer & Zignago, 2011). 
6. We considered alternative approaches to aid in the construction of the network. For instance, Chandra and Joba (2015) 
built a network on the trafficking of heroin among 17 European countries using differences in wholesale prices across 
countries. However, besides Western and Central Europe, few countries provide systematic data about wholesale prices. 
Therefore, using wholesale prices data would create problems of collinearity in testing the economic-driven behavior of 
traffickers. 
7. In a directed network, the number of possible edges equals N  (N N is the number of nodes (Wasserman & 
Faust, 1994). In the heroin trafficking network, the number of possible trading relationships is equal to 61  60 = 3,660. 
8. Maximum pseudo-likelihood estimation (MPLE) is used for parameter estimation in dyad independence models. For dyad 
dependence models, the maximum likelihood is approximated using Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulation 
methods. 
9. The probability of forming a tie is equal to Odds Ratio / (1 + Odds Ratio). 
10. Russia and, albeit to a lesser extent, Ukraine also have large internal markets for illicit opiates. However, in these countries, 
a substantial number of opiate users consume compote, a liquid substance obtained from poppy straw. Compote is mostly 
domestically produced, and it is less potent than heroin (Paoli, Greenfield, & Reuter, 2009). 
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